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1. Introduction 
 
The large differences in wages between Developed and Developing Countries cause a 
strong desire for migration towards the high wage Developed Countries. Developed 
Countries, however, are less willing to accept mass migration, even though the 
traditional international migration theory predicts that in most cases immigration is 
beneficial for the natives of the host country.
1 Most Developed Countries accept only 
a small percentage of prospective migrants from Developing Countries. This 
restrictive immigration policy is not only due to the effect of immigration on local 
labour market and wages but also due to the fiscal effects of immigration. In modern 
economies, governments impose income and other taxes and implement programs 
which transfer income in cash or in kind such as education, health etc. It is argued that 
immigrants are net fiscal beneficiaries in the sense that their contributions through 
taxes fall short of the direct or indirect benefits they enjoy from such government 
provisions. Wildasin (2004), for example, found that in Germany, Sweden and 
Demark where the immigrants are around 10 percent of the total population, that they 
are recipients of over 30 percent of the total cash welfare expenditures. 
In the last two decades, there is a growing interest in the literature on the 
welfare effects of migration in economies that impose taxes and make income 
transfers and provide public goods.
2 For example, Wildasin (1994) using a single 
good model with income taxes and transfers shows that free immigration may lead to 
Pareto- inferior outcomes if in the no-immigration situation owners of the immobile 
factor are being taxed to provide transfer payments to mobile workers. Michael 
(2003), in a model with income taxes and transfers, many factors of production and 
many traded and non-traded goods has shown that marginal immigration hurts the 
natives when labour is homogeneous.
3   
In recent years the immigration policies of the Developed Countries are 
designed in such a way so that immigration is easier for the skilled rather than the 
unskilled workers. For example, Carrington and Detragiache (1998) using data for 
                                                 
1 It has been shown that in the absence of income taxes, transfers and public goods, finite permanent 
migration is beneficial for the nationals in the host country and detrimental for people left behind in the 
source country and that marginal migration has no welfare effects in either country (e.g., Berry and 
Soligo 1969, Wong 1985 and Quibria 1988). 
2 Michael and Hatzipanayotou (2001) have examined the welfare effects of migration in a model where 
revenue from indirect taxes are used to finance the provision of public goods. 
3 Income taxes and transfers in migration models have also been used among others by Huizinga 
(1999), Bucovetsky (2003) and Epstein and Hillman (2003).   2
OECD countries find that individuals with little or no education generally have 
limited access to international migration mainly due to institutional barriers. It is 
argued that this is due to the fact that skilled immigrants are expected to be net fiscal 
contributors and thus their immigration is beneficial for the natives.
4,5 This is in line 
with the finding of Wellisch and Wildasin (1996) where in a model with constant 
goods prices and many jurisdictions have shown that immigration raises welfare in 
jurisdictions where immigrants are net fiscal contributors and it lowers welfare in 
jurisdictions where they are net fiscal beneficiaries.
6 
The purpose of this paper is to extend the previous results and to try to explain 
the phenomenon whereby in many European countries although the immigration 
policies are designed to facilitate the immigration of the skilled, fiscal contributors 
workers, at the end,  the majority of immigrants are net fiscal beneficiaries unskilled 
workers. To achieve this, we build a model where we have two types of workers, 
skilled with more education and high ability and productivity and unskilled with less 
education and low ability and productivity.  The government imposes the same 
income tax rate on all incomes and the tax receipts are equally distributed to all 
residents. Within this framework and under different scenarios regarding the 
international mobility of skilled, unskilled workers and capital we examine the effects 
on the welfare of natives of changes in immigration policies which change the 
immigration cost and induce or discourage immigration. Governments can change the 
immigration cost using either taxes and or other indirect ways which can impede or 
facilitate immigration by making it less or more risky, and less or more expensive. 
This model can describe, for example, the situation in the countries of the European 
Union, where there are free movements of labour and capital between them, and each 
country can take measures to encourage or discourage immigration of certain types of 
labour from non European Union countries (e.g., to encourage the immigration of 
                                                 
4 Another reason for the less restrictive immigration policy for high-skilled workers is the shortage of  
high-skilled workers in many developed countries. See for example Bauer and Kunze (2004). 
5 Bellettini and Ceroni (2003) assuming that migration rate is higher among highly educated workers 
show that the optimal immigration policy from the point of view of natives is an immigration quota 
above a certain minimum level. 
6 Razin and Sadka (2004), in an infinite-horizon, overlapping generations economy, show that this net 
burden due to immigration of the low-skilled labour could change to net gain to the native-born 
population.      3
skilled labour).
7 We identify the conditions under which government policies which 
change the immigration cost can improve or deteriorate the welfare of natives. For 
example, it is shown that, in the absence of capital mobility, if skilled and unskilled 
labour is complements in production, as many empirical studies attest to a high degree 
of complementarities between the two factors, then a decrease in the immigration cost 
of skilled labour, which causes inflow of net fiscal contributor skilled labour, 
decreases the welfare of natives.  
 
2. The Model 
Consider a small open country, Home, that trades freely with the rest of the 
world. In Home there are two types of workers, skilled and unskilled. Skilled workers 
are more educated, have more abilities and thus are more productive.  There are three 
types of agents, those possessing only one unit of unskilled labour, those possessing 
only one unit of skilled labour and finally those possessing one unit of capital. 
Migration is assumed to take place only from the group of agents possessing only a 
unit of either skilled or unskilled labour. Moreover, migration is assumed to be 
permanent in the sense that immigrants do not remit any of their income earnings in 
the host country to the source country. We denote with L the number of agents that 
posses only unskilled labour, with H the number of agents that posses only skilled 
labour and with F the number of agents that posses only capital.   
 Let  ) (
j j u e  be the minimum expenditure of an individual belonging to group 
j (j=L,H,F) required to achieve a level of utility u given the fixed world prices of 
goods. The country produces many traded goods using skilled and unskilled labour, 
and capital (i.e., K). With R(L,H,K) we denote the maximum value of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP)  given the goods prices and the domestic supply of factors 
of production. The fixed prices of the traded goods are omitted from the GDP 
function since they do not affect the analysis. The partial derivatives of the R(H,K,L) 
function with respect to L, H, and K  (i.e., RL, RH, and RK ) give the marginal revenue 
products of  unskilled, skilled workers and capital, respectively. Our assumption that 
skilled workers are more productive than the unskilled ones implies that RH>RL. The 
                                                 
7 The analysis is also applicable to non EU countries. For example, USA relaxes its immigration 
policies on skilled workers which cause their inflow. The inflow of skilled workers increases the wages 
of unskilled workers which somehow, legally or illegally, make their way into USA.   4
GDP function is assumed strictly concave in both types of labour and capital (e.g., 
RLL<0) and homogenous of degree one in all factors.
 8 
Capital is perfectly mobile internationally and Home is a small country in the 
world capital markets. Equilibrium in the Home capital market requires that  
 
) , , ( ) 1 (
* K H L R r K ρ − = ,                                                                                (1)      
            
where r* is the world net rate of return to capital and  ρ  is the Home linear income tax 
rate and is the same for all income from all factors of production and it is assumed 
fixed.
9 Income tax revenue is equally distributed to all residents in the country.
10 That 
is, each agent in the country receives a transfer payment N K L H R T / ) , , ( ρ = , where 
N =L+H+F, is the total number of residents (agents) in the country.
11 Since ρ  is 
fixed, T is adjusted to satisfy the budget constraint when migration occurs. 
  The country’s income expenditure identity requires that expenditure by all 
residents must equal to total net income from production plus transfer payments, 
minus net payments to foreign capital.
12 That is 
 
f F F H H L L K r K H L R u Fe u He u Le
* ) , , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( − = + + ,                                            (2) 
 
where K
f is positive (negative) if the Home is a net capital importer (exporter). 
  It is assumed that an immigrant receives as a wage his marginal revenue 
product of its labour. Thus, a skilled or an unskilled worker migrates if in the host 
country his net income from labour plus the transfer payments minus the migration 
cost is higher than the net income he receives in the source country and migration 
                                                 
8 This assumption implies that  0 < jj R  and   0
2 > − ij ii jj R R R for  i,j=L,K,H. Note that when the 
number of traded goods equal the number of factors of production, the above assumption does not hold. 
9 See Razin and Sadka (1995) for the use of a linear income tax rate in a similar analysis. 
10 Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002), in a political economy model, link the rate of low-skill immigration 
with the tax burden and redistribution. Using data on 11 European countries, they found that higher 
share of low-education immigrants in the population leads to a lower tax rate on labour income and less 
generous transfers.   
11 It is assumed that the redistributive fiscal policy is fixed and that the new immigrants cannot be 
excluded from the benefits and costs of this policy. That is, the country treads all individuals equally 
regardless of their origin. For an extensive discussion of this issue, see for example Wellisch and 
Wildasin (1996). 
12 The analysis of this paper considers changes in policies which cause marginal migration.   5
stops when the two are equal. Thus equilibrium in the j




j t T K H L R w − + − = ) , , ( ) 1 (
* ρ ,                                                              (3) 
 
where w
*j is the net income of a worker that belongs to group j (j=L,H) receives in the 
source  country and tj is the migration cost of a worker that belongs in group j. The 
migration cost can include taxes, moving cost, settlement cost etc. It is assumed that 
the host country is small in the world factor markets and thus the inflow of foreign 
workers does not affect their net income they receive in the source countries. 
  The expenditure of a worker that belongs in group j equals his net wage 
income, plus the transfer payments he receives and is given by 
 
T R e j
j + − = ) 1 ( ρ .                                                                                         (4) 
   
The social welfare function is defined as the weighed sum of utilities of all 
agents in the country with constant number of individuals. Differentiating equation (2) 
and using equations (1), (3) and (4), we get 
 








u du Fe du He du Le dW + + =  is the weighted sum of changes in the 
utility of all the initial residents in the host country.
13 We call dW the change in social 
welfare or the change in the welfare of natives. Also, using equation (4), we 
defined N NR R j j / ) ( − = λ . For the unskilled labour  N NR R L L / ) ( − = λ  is positive 
since it is assumed that its marginal revenue product is lower than that of the skilled 
labour. In other words,  ((/ ) ) LL L R NR R R λ =− = − , where  / R RN = ,  is positive 
since the average income is greater than the marginal revenue product of the unskilled 
labour. Intuitively, an unskilled worker receives  N R/ ρ  transfer payments and pays 
L R ρ  taxes. Since the former exceeds the latter, the unskilled worker is a net fiscal 
                                                 
13 Since the prices of goods are fixed, changes in the utilities of individuals are perfect measures of 
changes in incomes.    6
beneficiary.  For the skilled labour, however,  (( ) / ) H HH R NR N R R λ =− = − can be 
either positive or negative. In the case where only skilled and unskilled labour exists, 
that is, no other factors exist, then  H λ  is unambiguously negative. For the analysis 
that follows, it is assumed that  H λ  is negative. The assumption that  H λ  is negative 
implies that the marginal revenue product of the skilled labour is greater than the 
average income and that the skilled workers are net fiscal contributors. That is, the tax 
payments of a skilled worker  H R ρ  exceed the transfer payments he receives N R/ ρ .  
Let us also define K K R R λ =− . We assume that a capitalist is also net fiscal 
contributor and thus  K λ  is negative. Equation (5) shows that an inflow (outflow) of 
unskilled workers reduces (increases) the social welfare of the country if the domestic 
supply of the other factors remain fixed. The opposite, however, is true for the skilled 
workers. An inflow (outflow) of skilled workers increases (decreases) social welfare.  
  Differentiating equation (1) and (3) gives 
 
0 ) )( 1 ( = + + − dH R dL R dK R KH KL KK ρ ,                                                         (6)  
 
             
* [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ]
[(1 ) ] 0.
j
jH H jL L
jK K j
Ndw NR dH NR dL
NR R dK Ndt
ρρ λ ρρ λ
ρρ
=− − +− −
+− + − =
                             (7)  
 
3. Migration with internationally immobility of capital 
In this section, for simplicity, it is assumed that capital is internationally 
immobile and that foreign owned capital does not exists in the country. That is, Home 
economic policies do not induce any international movements of capital, and thus the 
stock of the capital in the country remains fixed. Under this assumption we examine 
two cases. In case one, the international mobility of unskilled workers is free while 





                                                 
14 The analysis of this paper, as we have mentioned before, considers changes in policies which cause 
marginal immigration. In the case where we have finite immigration and the immigrants receive as a 
wage, the marginal revenue product of the last immigrant, then in this case there is an extra, positive 
effect, on the welfare of natives.   7
3.1 International mobility of unskilled workers 
First, it is assumed that unskilled workers are freely mobile internationally but 
the international mobility of skilled workers is restricted. Using equation (5) and 
equation (7) for the case where j=L, and noting that dH=0, we get the effect of a 
change in the immigration cost of unskilled workers as follows: 
 
  L L L N dt dW λ ρ − = Δ ) / ( ,                                                                                 (8) 
 
where  L LL L NR ρλ ρ − − = Δ ) 1 (  and is negative. From equation (8) it is clear that an 
increase in the immigration cost of unskilled workers, who are net fiscal beneficiaries, 
reduces their immigration and raises the host country’s social welfare.
15   
Next, we examine how exogenous immigration of skilled workers affects 
social welfare in the presence of free international mobility of unskilled workers. 
Using equations (5) and (7) we get  
 
 ) ( ) 1 ( ) / (
1
LH LL L H LL L R R NR dH dW
− + − − = Δ λ λ ρ ρ .                                      (9)     
 
Equation (9) shows that an exogenous inflow of skilled workers increases social 
welfare if skilled and unskilled workers are substitutes in production (i.e., RLH <0). 
16 
Intuitively, the immigration of skilled workers increases welfare directly since they 
are net fiscal contributors and indirectly by reducing the immigration of the unskilled 
workers who are net fiscal beneficiaries.   If, however, skilled and unskilled workers 
are complements in production (i.e., RLH>0), then the immigration of skilled workers 
causes also immigration of unskilled workers making the total welfare effect of an 
exogenous immigration of skilled labour ambiguous. To derive more precise results, 
we rewrite (9) as follows:   
  
 (/)( 1) ( / ) [ ( ) / ] LL L K L L L L H L L dW dH N H R F L ρ ρλ λ ε ε ε Δ= − + + .                (10)     
                                                 
15 As noted in the introduction, the government can change the immigration cost by using either taxes 
on labour movements, or by other indirect ways which could make immigration easier or harder and 
more or less expensive. 
16In the theory of production if RLH >0 (<0), then the two factors are q-complements (q-substitutes). In 
this paper when we say complements (substitutes) in production we mean q-complements (q-
substitutes). In the case where only two factors exist, with constant returns to scale production function, 
then the two factors are always q-complements in production (e.g., RLH>0), and p-substitutes.      8
 
where ( / )( / ) 0 LL L L RL L R ε =∂ ∂ ≺ ,    ( / )( / ) LH L L R HHR ε = ∂∂ ,  0 KK RR λ = −< , and 
we make used of the fact that 
f
LHK K LH F K R λλλ ++= . Note that in this section we 
assume that there is no foreign capital in the country( 0)
f K = . From equation (10) we 
see that if skilled and unskilled labour are complements in production and the 
elasticity of the wage rate of the unskilled labour with respect to skilled labour is 
greater than the absolute value of the elasticity of the wage rate of the unskilled labour 
with respect to unskilled labour (i.e.,  LH LL ε ε >− ) (sufficient but not necessary 
condition) then the inflow of the skilled labour unambiguously decreases social 
welfare. Intuitively, when skilled and unskilled workers are complements in 
production and the elasticity is high, the inflow of skilled workers increases a lot the 
wage rate for the unskilled ones which causes a large inflow of them. Thus, even 
though the inflow of skilled workers has a positive effect on the welfare of natives, 
the resulting large inflow of unskilled workers has a negative effect, which dominates 
the positive one and causes the welfare of natives to decrease. Most of the studies 
surveyed by Hamermesh (1993, p.110) found that blue collar workers are 
complements in production with white collar workers and the elasticities of 
substitution between blue and white collar workers are higher than the absolute value 
of the own demand elasticity of the blue collar workers. We can consider the blue 
collar workers as the unskilled workers and the white collar workers as the skilled 
workers. Based on the results of the above studies we can conclude that the inflow of 
the skilled workers decreases social welfare.
17  
 
3.2 International mobility of skilled workers 
Next, it is assumed that there is international mobility of skilled workers, 
while the international mobility of unskilled workers is restricted. Within this 
framework, we examine how changes in the immigration cost of the skilled workers 
and how an exogenous inflow of unskilled workers affects social welfare. Using 
equation (5) and equation (7) for the case where j=H, gives 
 
                                                 
17For example, Germany increases the immigration of high skilled net fiscal contributors’ computer 
scientists from India. This causes the immigration of unskilled net fiscal beneficiary workers from 
Poland which decreases the welfare of natives in Germany.   9
                       H H H N dt dW λ ρ − = Δ ) / ( ,                                                                    (11) 
 
where  H HH H NR ρλ ρ − − = Δ ) 1 ( and is negative.
18 Equation (11) shows that a 
decrease in the immigration cost of skilled workers increases social welfare. 
Intuitively, the decrease in the immigration cost causes domestic supply of skilled 
workers to increase and since they are net fiscal contributors social welfare increases. 
  The effect of an exogenous immigration of unskilled workers, e.g., due to a 
relaxation of immigration restrictions, on social welfare is given by 
 
] [ ) 1 ( ) / (
1
HL HH H L HH H R R NR dL dW
− + − − = Δ λ λ ρ ρ .                                    (12)     
 
Equation (12) shows that an exogenous immigration of unskilled workers decreases 
social welfare if skilled and unskilled workers are substitutes in production (i.e., 
RHL<0). Intuitively, when an unskilled worker immigrates, social welfare decreases 
directly since he is a net fiscal beneficiary and indirectly by reducing the immigration 
of skilled workers who are net fiscal contributors. If, however, skilled and unskilled 
workers are complements in production, then the immigration of unskilled workers 
causes immigration of skilled workers and the indirect effect on welfare is positive, 
making the total effect on welfare ambiguous.   
  To make things more clear lets rewrite equation (12) as 
 
(/ )( 1) ( / )[ ( ) /] H HH K H HH HL HH dW dL N L R F H ρ ρλ λ ε ε ε Δ= − + + .             (13)     
 
where ( / )( / ) 0 HH H H RH H R ε =∂ ∂ ≺ ,    ( / )( / ) HLH H R LLR ε = ∂∂ ,  0 KK RR λ =− <, 
and we make used of the fact that 
f
LHK K LH F K R λλλ ++= . Note that in this section 
we assume that 0
f K = . From equation (13) we see that if skilled and unskilled labour 
are complements in production and the elasticity of the wage rate of the skilled labour 
with respect to unskilled labour is greater than the absolute value of the elasticity of 
                                                 
18 The sign of  H Δ is not clear that is negative.  Using equations (5) and (7) when dL=0, and 
considering welfare and the net income of the skilled workers as the endogenous variable we get that 
) / (
* dH dw
H = H Δ .  It is assumed that an increase in the domestic supply of skilled workers 
decreases the net income of a skilled worker, which implies that  H Δ  is negative.     10
the wage rate of the skilled labour with respect to skilled labour (i.e.,  HLH H ε ε >− ) 
(necessary but not sufficient), then the inflow of the unskilled labour may increase 
social welfare. For example, if  2 HLH H ε ε = −   and the skilled workers and capitalist 
have the same income and thus H K λ λ = , then the inflow of unskilled workers will 
increase social welfare if the number of skilled workers exceeds that of domestic 
capitalists (i.e., H>F). As we mentioned before, most of the studies surveyed by 
Hamermesh (1993, p.110) found that blue collar workers are complements in 
production with white collar workers and the elasticities between blue and white 
collar workers are much higher, and in many case more than double,  than the 
absolute value of the own demand elasticity of the white collar workers. Based on the 
results of the above studies we can conclude that the inflow of the unskilled workers 
is very likely to increase social welfare. 
19 
 
3.3 Free international mobility of both types labour 
In this subsection, it is assumed that both skilled and unskilled labour are 
freely mobile internationally, and examine how changes in the immigration cost on 
each type of labour affects social welfare. Using equations (5) and (7) for the case 
where j=L,H, we get 
 
] [ ) / (
1
HL HH H L HH L LH R R NR dt dW
− − − = Δ λ λ ρ ,                                              (14)     
 
            ) ( ) / (
1
LH LL L H LL H LH R R NR dt dW
− − − = Δ λ λ ρ ,                                               (15)     
           
where ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
2
HL HH L HL LL H HL HH LL LH R R R R R R R N − − − − − − = Δ ρλ ρλ ρ  and is 
positive under the assumption that an increase in the domestic supply of a factor 
decreases its net domestic income. This assumption is maintained throughout the 
analysis. The welfare effects of an increase in the immigration cost on unskilled 
(skilled) labour are similar to those when we have an exogenous inflow of unskilled 
                                                 
19 These results are different from those of  Kemnitz (2003), where in a model  of unemployment of 
low skilled workers and pensions, found that immigration of low-skilled workers benefits the native 
population as a whole. His results however, are based on a different model and assumptions. That is, he 
assumes that only low-skilled workers contributes to unemployment benefits, no other  taxes and 
income transfers exists besides unemployment benefits and pensions, and the supply of high skilled 
workers is fixed. Thus, the immigration of low-skilled workers does not cause any change in the supply 
of high-skilled workers and consequently on the income taxes and transfers.        11
(skilled) labour. Thus, when skilled and unskilled workers are substitutes in 
production, then an increase in the immigration cost of unskilled workers and a 
decrease in the immigration cost of the skilled workers increase social welfare. When 
skilled and unskilled workers are complements in production, however, an increase in 
either immigration cost has an ambiguous effect on welfare. 
 
Proposition 1. Assume that skilled and unskilled labour is internationally mobile. 
  If skilled and unskilled labour are substitutes in production, then social 
welfare increases by reducing the immigration cost of skilled labour and by 
increasing that of unskilled labour 
  If however, they are complements in production, reducing the immigration 
cost of the skilled labour and increasing the immigration cost of the unskilled 
labour may reduce social welfare. For example i) a decrease in the 
immigration cost of the skilled labour that causes its immigration, reduces 
social welfare if  LH LL ε ε >− , ii) a decrease in the immigration cost of the 
unskilled labour that causes its immigration, increases social welfare if 
2 HLH H ε ε =− ,  H K λ λ = ,  and  H>F.    
 
4. International mobility of capital. 
In this section, it is assumed that there is free international mobility of capital, 
the stock of foreign owned capital at home is not zero, and we examine the welfare 
effects of the immigration policies towards skilled and unskilled labour. 
 
4.1 Free international mobility of capital and unskilled labour 
First, it is assumed that capital and unskilled labour are freely internationally 
mobile while skilled labour is immobile. Using equations (5), (6) and (7) for the case 
where j=L, we obtain the welfare effects of changing the immigration cost on 
unskilled labour as follows: 
        
) ( ) / (
1
KL KK K L KK L KL R R R NR dt dW
− + − = Δ λ ρ ,                                               (16) 
 
where ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
2
KL K KK L LK LL KK LK R R R R R R N + − − − = Δ λ ρ ρ  and is positive. 
Equation (16) shows that a decrease in the immigration cost decreases social welfare   12
if unskilled labour and capital are substitutes in production. In this case, the decrease 
in the immigration cost increases the domestic supply of unskilled labour and this 
decreases social welfare directly since unskilled labour is a net fiscal beneficiary and 
indirectly by causing a capital outflow which causes income tax revenue to decrease. 
If, however, capital and unskilled labour are complements in production, this indirect 
effect is of opposite sign and thus the total effect on welfare is ambiguous. For the 
latter case, in order to get more precise results we rewrite equation (16) as 
 
(/ ) ( / )[ ( ) ( ) /] KL L KK H K KK KL KK dW dt N L R R F H HR KR ρ εεε Δ= −− + + + + ,           (17) 
 
where ( / )( / ) KKK K R KKR ε =∂ ∂ , ( / )( / ) KLK K R LLR ε = ∂∂  and we make used of the 
facts that that 
f
LHK K LH F K R λλλ ++= ,  K K R R λ = − ,  ,  H H R R λ =− , K=F+K
f . 
Equation (17) shows that when  KLK K ε ε >−  and[( )/ ] ( / ) H FHH RR +> , then a 
decrease in the immigration cost of the unskilled labour that causes its immigration 
increases social welfare. For example, this can occur when KLK K ε ε >− , capitalists 
have the highest per capital income and the per capital income of skilled labour is 
closed to the average income. Intuitively, when capital and unskilled labour are 
complements in production and the elasticity is high, the inflow of unskilled labour 
causes a large inflow of capital. The positive effect of distributing the higher tax 
revenue from taxing capital income out weights the negative effect due to the inflow 
of the net fiscal beneficiaries’ unskilled workers and the welfare of natives increases. 
All the studies surveyed by Hamermesh (1993) found that blue collar workers (i.e., 
unskilled labour) and capital are complements in production and in some cases the 
elasticities are quite high. Unfortunately, however, there is no report for capital 
demand elasticities. 
 
4.2 Free international mobility of capital and skilled labour. 
Next, it is assumed that capital and skilled labour are freely mobile 
internationally while unskilled labour is immobile. Within this framework we 
examine how changes in the immigration cost of the skilled workers affect social 
welfare. Using equations (5), (6) and (7) for the case where j=H, we get 
                                                                                                                                      13
) ( ) / (
1
KH KK K H KK H HK R R R NR dt dW
− + − = Δ λ ρ ,                                            (18) 
 
where ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
2
KH K KK H HK HH KK HK R R R R R R N + − − − = Δ λ ρ ρ  and is positive.  
Equation (18) shows that a decrease in the immigration cost of the skilled 
labour increases social welfare if skilled labour and capital are complements in 
production (i.e., RKH >0). Intuitively, social welfare increases since the decrease in the 
immigration cost increases the immigration of skilled, net fiscal contributors, workers 
and this has a direct positive effect on social welfare. This direct effect is further 
enhanced by an indirect welfare improvement due to increased capital inflow and 
higher tax revenue from taxing capital income. In the studies surveyed by Hamermesh 
(1993), however, there is no conclusive evidence that capital and skilled labour are 
complements in production. 
 
Proposition 2.  
  When only capital and skilled labour are internationally mobile welfare 
increases by reducing the immigration cost on skilled labour if these two 
factors are complements in production. 
  When only capital and unskilled labour are internationally mobile, welfare 
decreases (may increase) by reducing the immigration cost of unskilled 
labour if these two factors are substitutes (complements) in production. For 
example, when unskilled labour and capital are complements, a decrease in 
the immigration cost of the unskilled labour that causes its immigration, 
increases social welfare if  KLK K ε ε >−  and[( )/ ] ( / ) H FHH RR +> . 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The immigration policy of some developed countries is designed in such a 
way that individuals with little or no education generally have limited access to 
permanent migration and immigrants tend to be better educated than the rest of the 
population in the country of origin. It is conjectured that this is so because skilled 
migrants are expected to be net fiscal contributors whose migration is not expected to 
affect negatively the welfare of natives in the host country. The opposite is argued for 
the migration of unskilled workers. To examine analytically this argument, we build a 
model with two types of workers, skilled workers with high productivity and     14
unskilled workers with low productivity. All incomes from various sources are taxed 
with the same rate and all tax revenue is equally distributed among all residents. 
Within this framework and under different scenarios concerning the international 
mobility of capital and the existence or not of restrictions in the migration of each 
type of labour, we examine how changes in the government policies which change the 
immigration cost and thus induce or discourage immigration affect the welfare of 
natives in the host country.  
The analysis is carried out within a framework of a small open economy in 
goods and factor markets. Within this framework, we find that the welfare effect on 
natives from a change in the immigration cost on a type of labour depends on whether 
this type of labour is a net fiscal contributor or beneficiary, on the relationship in 
production between the two types of labour and capital and on whether the other type 
of labour is a net fiscal contributor or beneficiary. For example, when capital is 
internationally immobile, then i) a decrease in the immigration cost of the net fiscal 
contributor skilled labour that causes its immigration, is very likely to reduce the 
welfare of natives, and ii) a decrease in the immigration cost of the net fiscal 
beneficiary unskilled labour that causes its immigration is likely to increase the 
welfare of natives. Thus, the common wisdom that the inflow of skilled workers, 
which are net fiscal contributors, increases the welfare of natives is unlikely to be true 
since this inflow causes movements of capital or unskilled labour which could affect 
negatively the welfare of natives. Similarly, the inflow of net fiscal beneficiary 
unskilled labour is likely to increase social welfare.   
The analysis of the paper suggests, for example, that if a country, cannot 
control directly the immigration of unskilled labour, as is the case with the countries 
members of the European Union, then the net income of the existing residents might 
actually fall if immigration of the net fiscal contributors’ skilled workers from non 
European Union countries is encouraged.  
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